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VOL. I JUNE, 1947 No. 2
THE PROBATE JURISDICTION OF THE
WAR DEPARTMENT
JOHN G. STEPHENSON, III*
E VERY generation' of Americans has been faced with
the problem of burying its war dead and settling their
estates. To the extent that this involves the disposition
of property possessed in garrison or in the field and of
pay and other amounts due from the United States, it is
accomplished by an administrative procedure which as-
sumes importance in time of war and is all to quickly
forgotten with the return of peace. This procedure has
received little attention in legal literature; but it is never-
theless an important chapter in Probate Law as well as in
Military Law. If better understood, particularly in the
* Professor of Law, The University of Miami; A.B. Princeton Univer-
sity, 1931; LL.B. Harvard University, 1934; member of the Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania Bar.
I There have been seven major wars declared by Congress: the Revolu-
tionary Wax, 1776-1783; the War of 1812, 1812-1815; the Mexican War,
1846-1848; the Civil War, 1861-1865; the Spanish-American War, 1898;
the First World War, 1917-1918; and the Second World War, 1941-1945.
This amounts to a call upon the full resources of the nation once in each
generation, as distinguished from the almost constant employment of the
regular forces in Indian warfare until 1898, and along the border and in
insular possessions since that time. See Ganoe, History of the United
States Army (1942); Albion, Introduction to Military History (1929).
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light of the experiences of the war now ending,2 it may
be reformed and improved to accomplish what appear to
be its principal ends: to safeguard and turn over to widow
or next of kin, with due regard for the rights of creditors,
the property taken into or acquired during service, and
to relieve troops needed for tactical purposes of as much
administrative detail as possible. This must be done within
the proper scope of governmental power.
The problem is incidental to the concept of dual citizen-
ship peculiar to the federal system established by the
Constitution of the United States. Each of the citizen-
soldiers who form the bulk of the war time armies of the
United States, is at once a citizen of the United States
and of one of the several states, territories,3 or the District
of Columbia. Military service and full obedience to the
orders and discipline thereof are demanded of him as a
citizen of the United States;- but his rights of property,
including descent and distribution, are in general governed
by the laws of the state of his domicile. There are there-
fore two phases to our inquiry: the first, to disco'er the
extent of the power of the federal government to control
the disposition of the property of persons in military
2 The writer served as a member of the faculty of the Judge Advocate
General's School, U. S. Army, at Ann Arbor, Michigan, from May, 1943,
to February, 1946, where he lectured on the administrative procedures
discussed in this article. The article is based primarily on research con-
ducted at that time; but the writer has attempted a fresh and independent
approach to the subject. It is believed that a challenge of the constitti-
tional foundation of the Army's "probate jurisdiction" may be productive
of sound revision if -made at this time, particularly when the related
punitive and disciplinary measures of military law are being subjected
to scrutiny.
3 Within the territories and the District of Columbia, the power of
Congress is plenary. See El Paso Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87,
30 S. Ct. 21, 54 L. Ed. 106 (1909). The discussion which follows will
be limited accordingly to problems raised where the decedent is a citizen
of one of the several states. The question remains, however, whether
Congress has intended to supersede territorial law or that otherwise
provided for the District of Columbia.
4 Compulsory military service may be exacted under a federal draft
law or by a call of militia. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366,
38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L. Ed. 349 (1918); Cox v. Wood, 247 U. S. 3, 38 S. Ct.
421, 62 L. Ed. 947 (1918). Militiamen called into federal service are
subject to federal law from the date of call. Martin v, Mott, 12 Wheat.
29. 6 L. Ed. 537 (1827).
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service; the second, to determine to what extent this
power has been asserted.
Where a person dies in military service, the effects
which he has with him in camp or quarters may be col-
lected and turned over to an executor or administrator,
appointed by a court in the state of the decedent's domi-
cile.5 Likewise, the War Department may make settlement
S Article of War 112; 41 Stat. 809 (1920), 10 U. S. C. §1584 (1940).
The full text of this article follows:
"In case of the death of any person subject to military law the com-
manding officer of the place or command will permit the legal repre-
sentative or widow of the deceased, if present, to take possession of all
his effects then in camp or quarters; and if no legal representative or
widow be present, the commanding officer shall direct a summary court
to secure all such effects, and said summary court shall have authority
to collect and receive any debts due decedent's estate by local debtors
and to pay the undisputed local creditors of decedent in so far as any
money belonging to the deceased which may come into said summary
court's possession under this article will permit, taking receipts therefor
for file with said court's final report upon its transactions to the War
Department; and as soon as practicable after the collection of such ef-
fects said summary court shall transmit such effects and any money
collected, through the Quartermaster Department, at Government tx:-
pense, to the widow or legal representative of the deceased, if such be
found by said court, or to the son, daughter, father, provided the
father has not abandoned the support of his family, mother, brother,
sister, or the next of kin in the order named, if such be found by said
court, or the beneficiary named in the will of the deceased, if such be
found by said court, and said court shall thereupon make to the War
Department a full report of its transactions; but if there be none of the
persons hereinabove named, or such persons or their addresses are not
known to or readily ascertainable by said court, and the said court shall
so find, said summary court shall have authority to convert into cash,
by public or private sale, not earlier than thirty days after the death of
the deceased, all effects of deceased except sabers, insignia, decorations,
medals, watches, trinkets, manuscripts, and other axticles valuable
chiefly as keepsakes; and as soon as practicable after converting such
effects into cash said summary court shall deposit with the proper
officer, to be designated in regulations, any cash belonging to decedent's
estate, and shall transmit a receipt for such deposits, any will or other
papers of value belonging to the deceased, any sabers, insignia, decora-
tions, medals, watches, trinkets, manuscripts, and other articles valuable
chiefly as keepsakes, together with an inventory of the effects secured
by said summary court, and a full account of its transactions, to the
Var Department for transmission to the Auditor for the War Depart-
ment (General Accounting Office) for action as authorized by law in




with the personal representative of the amount due the
decedent for pay and allowances or other items.' The
personal representative is accountable to the probate court,
and administers the estate in accordance with state law.
To this extent there is no problem. Statutory authority
7
exists, however, and is employed in a majority of cases,
for the War Department to turn over the effects to, and
make settlement of accounts with, the widow or next of
kin in the event that letters testamentary or of adminis-
tration have not been granted. It is not necessary to show
that a personal representative cannot be appointed or
that the estate is too small to warrant the expense In
the disposition of effects, use is made of a summary court-
634 Stat. 750 (1906) as amended, 58 Stat. 789 (1944), 10 U. S. C. § 868
(Supp. 1946). The full text of this statute follows:
"In the settlement of the accounts of deceased officers or enlisted men
of the Army, where the amount due the decedent's estate is less than
$1,000 and no demand is presented by a duly appointed legal representa-
tive of the estate, the accounting officers may allow the amount found
due to the decedent's widow, or legal heirs in the following order of
precedence: First, to the widow; second, if decedent left no widow, or
the widow be dead at time of settlement, then to the children or their
issue, per stirpes; third, if no widow or descendents, then to the father
and mother in equal parts, provided the father has not abandoned the
support of 'his family, in which case to the mother alone; fourth, if
either the father or mother be dead, then to the one surviving; fifth,
if there be no widow, child, father, or mother at the date of settlement,
then to the brothers and sisters and children of deceased brothers and
sisters, per stirpes. Where 'the amount due the decedent's estate is
$1,000 or more and no demand is presented by a duly appointed legal
representative of the estate, the accounting officers may allow $1,000
of the amount due to the estate to the widow or legal heirs in the order
of precedence hereinabove set forth: Providcd, That this section shall
not be so construed as to prevent payment from the amount due the
decedent's estate of funeral expenses, provided a claim therefore is
presented by the person or persons who actually paid the same before
settlement by the accounting officers."
7 See notes 5 and 6, supra.
S Cash amounting to more than $2,000 found among the decedent's
effects may be delivered to the widow under the authority of Article of
War 112 (note 5, supra) without requiring her to obtain letters of ad-
ministration. 5 Bull. J.A.G. 342 (1946). In recommending that the
amount which may be settled under 34 Stat. 750 (1906) (note 6, supra)
be increased from $500 to $1,000, the house committee stated that this
would permit settlement w.ithout administration of the accounts ot
almost all persons dying in service who had no other estate. H. Rep. No.
1919, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
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martial,9 which has been given limited power to receive
and pay debts due to, or owing by, the deceased, and to
sell effects. Statutory authority0 was obtained during the
late war to declare a soldier dead when he had been miss-
ing for at least a year, and to proceed with the disposition
of his effects and settlement of his accounts on the basis
of this administrative determination.
It will be noted that these procedures recognize the
superior right of a personal representative, appointed in
a state court of probate, to administer the estate of a
person dying in military service. In aid thereof, they
provide that the effects may be secured and delivered at
government expense to the personal representative when
he is at a distance. Where no personal representative has
been appointed, they provide a system of distribution
without administration to the extent that the amount due
from the government upon War Department accounts
does not exceed one thousand dollars, and without limit as
to the value of effects or the cost of shipment. The pro-
visions of the Missing Persons Act authorizing an ac-
celerated settlement of the estates of presumed decedents
increase substantially the number of estates which can
be settled only under federal procedure, since the period
9 A summary court-martial consists of one officer. It may be appoint-
ed by the commanding officer of a garrison or regiment and by officers
of smaller commands having equivalent responsibility. It may also be
appointed by superior authority. Articles of War 7 and 10, 41 Stat. 788,
9 (1920), 10 U.S.C. §§ 1478, 81 (1940). In addition to exercising the
probate jurisdiction conferred by Article 112, a summary court acts as
coroner when death occurs at a place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States. Article 113, 41 Stat. 810 (1920), 10 U.S.C. § 1585
(1940).
t0 Sec. 5, The Missing Persons Act; 56 Stat. 145 (1942) as amended,
56 Stat. 1093 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1005 (Supp. 1946). The full text
of this section follows:
"When the twelve months' period from date of commencement of
absence is about to expire in any case of a person missing or missing
in action and no official report of death or of being a prisoner or of
being interned has been received, the head of the department concerned
shall cause a full review of the case to be made. Following such review
and when the twelve months' absence shall have expired, or following
any subsequent review of the case which shall be made whenever war-
ranted by information received or other circumstances, the head of the
department concerned is authorized to direct the continuance of the
1947]
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required by state law is generally longer."
The constitutional power of the federal government to
make such provisions has never adequately been examined.
Prior to 1906, when these procedures first appeared in
statutory form, there was no problem. Settlement was
authorized only with the personal representative. Since
then, the Judge Advocate General, apparently believing
that the statute approached a point exceeding the Con-
stitutional authority of the federal government, instituted
a series of administrative interpretations'2 which would
avoid conflict with state jurisdiction. The rule was an-
nounced that Article 112 was not a statute of descent and
distribution."3 Accordingly, while the statute authorizes
person's missing status, if the person may reasonably be presumed to
be living, or is authorized to make a finding of death. When a finding
of death is made it shall include the date upon which death shall be
presumed to have occurred for the purposes of termination of crediting
pay and allowances, settlements of accounts, and payments of death
gratuities and such date shall be the day following the day of expira-
tion of an absence of twelve months, or in cases in which the missing
status shall have been continued as hereinbefore authorized, a day to be
determined by the head of the department:'
1, In general, probate proceedings may not be instituted until a
missing person has been absent seven years. This is based upon a com-
mon law presumption of death from continued and unexplained absence.
For the essential requirements of such proceedings (due process), see
Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 38 L. Ed. 896, 14 S. Ct. 1108 (1893).
12 Administrative construction of legislation governing the War De-
partment is found in Army regulations and in opinions of the Judge
Advocate General, who acts as counsel to the Secretary of War. Army
regulations are of two types: Army Regulations, which are of a more or
less permanent character, and War Department Circulars, which deal
with temporary wartime conditions. Opinions of the Judge Advocate
General appear digested in several series, the latest covering the years
1912-40, and in a pamphlet, the Bulletin, published monthly beginning
in 1942. Opinions rendered in connection with the formulation or revision
of Army Regulations are seldom published, since they are reflected in
the regulations adopted. A few unpublished opinions are cited in these
notes by file number and date.
13 Inasmuch as the matter of the distribution of estates of decedents is
and always has been a matter of state regulation, the War Department
may not issue instructions to the executor regarding the disposition of
decorations. Opinion of June 19, 1922; Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 385
(1942). The summary court is not a personal representative, and there-
fore may not indorse stock certificates to effect transfer. Opinion of
June 25, 1921; Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 386 (1942).
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delivery to "the widow or legal representative", the latter
will always be preferred."4 Delivery of effects to a person
other than the personal representative discharges the
summary court, but vests no title in the distributee. 15 This
rule of interpretation is not sufficient to justify all the
statutory provisions; for example, those authorizing the
summary court to sell effects if the distributees cannot
be found. The Comptroller General does not appear to
have considered the problem. It is, of course, a moot
question whether an administrative officer should question
the constitutionality of statutes which he is appointed
to enforce."
As a general rule, statutes of descent and distribution
fall within the field of regulation reserved to the states. 7
The federal government, being one of enumerated powers,
is given no specific power to deal with this subject. It has
been held, however, that state laws of descent and dis-
tribution must yield to federal where regulation is neces-
sary and proper to the exercise of one of the enumerated
powers.'8 The power of a state to take by escheat land
14 Opinion of March 29, 1928; Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 390 (1942).
I5 Where a widow was charged with murder, it was held that it
would not be improper to deliver effects to her. "Such delivery would
not and could not have (the effect of permitting the widow to make
herself an heir in fact), for it could not invest her with any title to the
property, nor could the refusal to turn over the effects divest her of
any title thereto, this matter being controlled solely by the statutes of
descent and the court decisions of the proper state." Opinion of
March 29, 1928; Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 390 (1942).
16 See note, "Raising the Constitutional Question by Officers in Man-
damus Proceedings" in Gellhorn, Administrative Law, Cases and Com-
ments, 830 (1940).
17 "As the authority to make wills is derived from the states and the
requirement of probate is but a regulation to make the will effective,
matters of strict probate are not within the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States." Pitney, J., in Suton v. English, 246 U. S. 199, 205, 62
L. Ed. 664, 38 S. Ct. 254 (1918). "A citizen of another state may estab-
lish a debt against the estate. But the debt thus established must take
its place and share of the estate as administered by the probate court."
Byers v. McCauley, 149 U. S. 608, 620, 37 L. Ed. 867, 13 S. Ct. 906 (1892).
See also cases cited in note 18, infra.
is Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 25 L. Ed. 628 (1879), Fairfax
v. Hunter, 7 Cranch 603, 3 L. Ed. 453 (1813); see Ware v. Hylton, 3
Dall. 199, 1 L. Ed. 568 (1796); Geoffroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 10 S. Ct.
295, 33 L. Ed. 642 (1880).
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descending to a foreigner has been superseded by treaties
with foreign nations, this being a proper exercise of the
treaty power. If it could be said that the proper conduct
of war requires a uniform rule of descent and distribution,
there would doubtless be power in the federal government.
under its general power to wage war,' to provide such
a law.
Inasmuch as the various statutes preserve to personal
representatives appointed under state law a prior right
to administer the estates of deceased military personnel,
they appear to be predicated upon the view that where
state laws do not afford a prompt, inexpensive remedy,
it is necessary and proper for the conduct of war to pro-
vide one. Otherwise combat troops would be burdened
with the property of decedents, and their dependents
would suffer hardship.
The proper exercise of the war power has embraced
many provisions for the welfare of the "home front". It
has justified a system of family allowances20 and com-
19 In this paragraph and the three which follow, the writer makes a
distinction between the specific power of Congress to provide rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces (Const.,
Art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 14) and the general power to provide all laws neces-
sary and proper to carry out the power of the federal government to
make war (Const., Art. 1, sec. 10, cl. 3; and c.f. Art. 1, sec. 8, cls. 11-16,
18). It may be suggested that federal jurisdiction is being asserted only
as to estates which are too small to justify recourse to state probate
procedures. This proposition must be denied emphatically. The
federal government, being one of expressly enumerated powers and
those which are the necessary and proper incidents thereof, cannot
derive power under the maxim tie minimis tex non curi.t.
2O The pay and allowances of enlisted men were generally inadequate
to meet the needs of persons with dependents. 'In order to malce it feasi-
ble to draft persons with dependents when necessary, family allowances
were provided in the Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act of June 23,
1942, as amended. 56 Stat. 381, 747 (1942), 57 Stat. 577 (1943), 37 USC.
§ 201 (Supp. 1946). Passage of this act did not entirely remove depend-
ency as a ground for deferment, however. See 56 Stat. 386 (1942), 50
USC. App. § 305 (e) (i) (Supp. 1946).
[Vol. I
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pulsory allotments" for the wives and dependents of
soldiers and officers. The Government provides life in-
surance on the lives of servicemen for the protection of
their dependents. 2 2 Allotments and family allowances for
dependents may be continued when an officer or soldier
has been reported missing until such time as he returns
or is determined to be dead.23 One who dies in military
service is buried at government expense, under the nation-
al flag," The family may be moved home at public ex-
pense. 5 A gratuity equal to six months' pay and allow-
ances is granted to the wife or other dependent relatives.26
Posthumous promotions may be made in proper cases.27
While it is true that the measures enumerated constitute
no more than a legislative interpretation of the war power,
not yet confirmed judicially, they serve to indicate a
recognition that modern war entails the support of the
whole nation, and may demonstrate the existence of fed-
21 Compulsory allotments are distinguished from allowances in that
the former are a charge upon pay due military personnel, while the
latter are in addition to pay and are granted directly to the dependent.
Compulsory allotments were authorized by sec. 7, Missing Persons Act;
56 Stat. 143, 1093 (1942), 58 Stat. 679 (1944), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1007
(Supp. 1946). Compulsory allotments were permitted by the War De-
partment only in extreme cases. (Par. 41, Army Regulations 35-5520,
Sept. 30, 1944).
22 54 Stat. 1009 (1940) with numerous amendments; 38 U.S.C. § 802
(Supp. 1946).
23 Sec. 3, Missing Persons Act; 56 Stat. 144 as amended, 56 Stat. 1092
11942), 58 Stat. 680 (1944), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1003 (Supp. 1946). Sec.
110c, d, Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act, 56 Stat. 384 (1942)
as amended, 57 Stat. 580 (1943), 37 U.S.C. § 210 (Supp. 1946).
2149 Stat. 1508 (1936), 52 U.S.C. § 164c, 10 U.S.C. § 455d (1940). cf.
52 Stat. 399 (1938), 10 U.S.C. § 916b (1940). Flags to drape the casket
are included among authorized funeral expenses by Army Regulations.
Persons dying in service are entitled to burial in national cemeteries at
government expense. R. S. 4878; 41 Stat. 552 (1920), 24 U.S.C. § 281
(1940).
25 Sec. 12, Missing Persons Act, 56 Stat. 146 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 1012 (Supp. 1946).
26 Provided for members of the Regular Army by 41 Stat. 367 (1919),
modified and amended, 42 Stat. 1385 (1923), 57 Stat. 599 (1943), 10
U.S.C. § 903 (Supp. 1946). Extended to all personnel of the reserve
components by 53 Stat. 557 (1939) as amended, 53 Stat. 1079 (1939),
55 Stat. 796 (1941), 10 U.S.C. § 456 (Supp. 1946).
27 56 Stat. 722 (1942), 10 U.S.C. § 491, 612 (Supp. 1946). Posthumous
promotions are for the satisfaction of the bereaved only. No increase in
pay, death gratuity or other monetary benefit results. § 5, id.
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eral power to enact the statutes under consideration.
If it had been customary from time immemorial, or at
least at the time of the Revolution, for military tribunals
to exercise probate jurisdiction and for the articles of
war to provide for the distribution of property, there
would be little difficulty in finding power to establish
such a system in the power of Congress to make rules for
the regulation of the military forces. The jurisdiction of
military courts is not precisely defined in the Constitution,
and usage is therefore an important factor in determining
the extent of their authority 8 It appears that in the
time of the Tudors and Stewarts such a jurisdiction
existed ;29 but this had disappeared from the British articles
before the Revolution. The British articles which were
effective in our own service prior to the outbreak of that
war provided that effects should be turned over to the
personal representative.3 0 This continued to be the rule
until 1916, when the provisions in the articles of war which
permitted effects to be delivered to a widow or to relatives
first made their appearance. Usage and contemporary
construction do not therefore support so broad a con-
struction of the power to make regulations for the govern-
ment of the military service.
28 "The general usage of the military service, or what may not unfitly
be called the customary military law." Story, J., in Martin v. Mott, 12
Wheat. 19, 35; 6 L. Ed. 537, 542 (1827). A resolution of the Continental
Congress, adopted by the Congress of the United States in 1806, punish-
ing alien spies with death "according to the law and usage of nations,
by sentence of a general court-martiaI" is a contemporary constructitin
permitting trial of the offense of espionage by court-martial, the
provisions of the constitution requiring indictment and trial by jury
to the contrary notwithstanding. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S. (A.
1, 87 L. Ed. 3 (1942).
29 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 761 (2d ed., 1920 reprint).
The full text of the various British and American codes cited herein may
be found in the appendix to this volume.
10 The first American "Articles of War" were enacted by resolution
of the Continental Congress on September 20, 1776, and were first en-
acted by the United States, April 10, 1806 (2 Stat. 371). Provisions
relating to decedents' effects are found in Section XV of the first code,
and in Articles 94 and 95 of the second. See Winthrop, Military Law
and Precedents, 969, 989 (2d ed., 1920 reprint).
[Vol. I
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The articles of war effective from the time of the
Revolution until 1916, with minor changes, required the
regimental major in the case of an officer, and the com-
pany commander in the case of an enlisted man, to secure
the effects of a decedent, file an inventory with the War
Department, and turn the effects over to the personal
representative." The officer charged with these duties
was in no sense an administrator. He had no power to
secure assets unless they were voluntarily surrendered,
except through the use of military orders where effective. 2
Army regulations, interpreting the word "effects" to in-
clude intangibles, permitted him to receive debts volun-
tarily paid. 3 The duties performed were military, not
administrative. Colonel William Winthrop, author of the
first comprehensive treatise on American military law,
was of the opinion that an officer exceeding his powers
would become an administrator de son tort. 4 He also
31 See note 30, supra. The articles of 1806 required the regimental
major to secure the effects of deceased officers, make an inventory
thereof before the next regimental court-martial, and transmit the in-
ventory and effects to the Board of War "to the end that his executors
may, after payment of his debts in quarters and interment, receive the
overplus, if any there be, to his or their use." In the case of enlisted men,
the troop or company commander withdrew military equipment, sent the
balance to the Board of War "which said effects are to be accounted for
and paid to the representative of such deceased soldier." The require-
ment that an officer's effects be inventoried before a regimental court
was dropped in 1806. A requirement that an enlisted man's effects be
inventoried before two officers appeared in 1806.
3a Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 762 (2d ed. 1920 reprint).
3., Note 32, supra.
34 The opinion expressed by Winthrop, that an officer exceeding his
authority to deal with the effects of a decedent would be liable as an
administrator de son tort is consonant with the view that an officer is
liable for acting beyond the scope of his authority. Sterling v. Constan-
tin, 287 U. S. 378, 53 S. Ct. 190, 77 L. Ed. 375 (1932). The fact that he
is a member of a court-martial does not alter the rule. Milligan (cf. ex
parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866) successfully proceeded
against the members of the court-martial which illegally sentenced him
to death. Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss. 13, 17 Fed. Cas. 380 (1871). Admin-
istrative settlement of a claim against the government, under 54 Stat.
372 (1943), 31 U.S.C. § 223b, c (Supp. 1946), has been allowed where a




pointed out that a nuncupative will, which is permitted
only to the soldier dying on the field, is valid only if ac-
cepted for probate in a state court. Inasmuch as the prop-
erty of a deceased officer of Winthrop's time would likely
include one or more horses, the regimental major, charged
with the care of effects, had a delicate problem if not au-
thorized to make expenditures for the preservation of the
property.35 Army regulations which would appear to be
without statutory sanction, authorized the sale of effects if
not claimed within two months, the proceeds to be held
until claimed."
In 1916, provision was made for transferring the duties
of the commanding officer or regimental major to a sum-
mary court in all cases where the widow or personal repre-
sentative was not present. 7 The summary court was au-
thorized to secure effects and to collect debts due locally.
If no claim was made by a personal representative within
thirty days, the summary court was authorized to sell
the effects. The balance was paid in to the auditor for
the War Department to be disbursed with other funds
due decedent on War Department account. A contem-
porary interpretation" to the effect that the widow or
personal representative, if not able to come to camp or
quarters and receive the effects, could obtain delivery
only by purchasing the effects from the summary court,
appears to have led to an amendment in 1918,11 authorizing
transmittal of effects at government expense. Also by the
35 A statute later provided for transportation at public expense of the
authorized mounts of deceased officers to the home of the family or
such place as may be designated by the personal representative. Disposal
of the mount as directed by the personal representative was also author-
ized, 40 Stat. 892, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1940).
36 See Winthrop, 763. The words "or the proceeds thereof" appeared
in the Articles of War of 1874. This was construed as giving legislative
sanction to regulations existing prior thereto which permitted sale. See
opinion dated Sept. 5, 1905, in Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 180 (1912 ed.) Pars. 85,
163, Army Regulations, 1913.
37 39 Stat. 668 (1916).
S Ops. J.A.G. 1918, 490. This opinion is reflected in the current digest.
Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, § 470(4) (1942). If the effects were sold, the
government asserted the right to set off indebtedness against the pro-
ceeds. See Sturgeon v. U. S., 60 Ct. C1. 94 (1924).
39 40 Stat. 883 (1918).
[Vol. I
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amendment of 1918, it was permitted that effects might
be turned over to other relatives or to beneficiaries under
the will. Various amendments, doubtless in response to
pressure of offended relatives, exempted manuscripts,
keepsakes, and other articles from sale. ' 0 Power to pay
debts out of any cash coming into the hands of the sum-
mary court was added in 1920.
4'
There is no authority to appoint a summary court-mar-
tial when the widow or personal representative is present.
42
Where both the widow and a personal representative are
present, the latter is preferred; but there is no authority
to refuse access to the widow if the personal representa-
tive is not present and does not see fit to appear.4 3 A
personal representative can prove his authority by present-
ing the usual certificate.44 It would seem that the widow
can prove hers by a marriage certificate; and Army per-
sonnel records generally confirm her identity. In on case, 5
40 The exemption of manuscripts and keepsakes first appeared in 40
Stat. 883 (1918). The disposition of unsold effects was further controlled
by 46 Stat. 1203 (1931), 10 U.S.C. § 1584 (1940). Sale of stocks, bonds,
and commercial paper is further limited by par. 30, Army Regulations
600-550, Dec. 23, 1944.
41 41 Stat. 807 (1920).
42 Army regulations governing the disposition of the effects of persons
dying in distant theatres, recognize the statutory right of the widow or
personal representative to take if present. Par 1 b, War Dept. Circular
No. 85, March 16, 1945; Opinion J.A.G., file 1943/3154, March 3, 1943.
The widow or personal representative is present if able to receive deliv-
ery of the effects in person. Opinion J.A.G., file 1943/16315, November
13, 1943.
43 "While the Article does not require it, it is believed to be the better
practice where an executor or administrator has been appointed, to
deliver or transmit the effects to such appointee, except in cases where
the widow is present and the executor or administrator is not." Opinion
of Sept. 22, 1923, Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 389 (1942). Where the
widow's status is in dispute, effects should be delivered to personal
representative. 2 Bull. J.A.G, 144 (1943),
44 Opinion of May 8, 1922; Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 388 (1942). An
affidavit by personal representative that he is the executor, administra-
tor, or legal representative is insufficient. ibid.
4s This account is based upon a personal interview with the summary
court officer, who believed that the deceased officer purposely suppressed
the record of his marriage for fear he would be dismissed from flying
training. In the end, the court satisfied itself by inquiry among the
decedent's friends that the claim was genuine. These facts were not
presented in the opinion. (File 210.871, April 22, 1942).
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the commanding officer found an alleged widow present
who was not disclosed on the deceased officer's personnel
record. She had no certificate of marriage, because the
justice of the peace had died without mailing the form
to the register. The commanding officer referred the
matter to a summary court to determine the widow's
claim. The Judge Advocate General approved this pro-
cedure; but it may be noted that if the summary court
found the alleged widow's claim genuine, the finding
would be a nullity because there is no authority to appoint
a summary court where the widow is present.
If neither the widow nor personal representative is
present, the commanding officer should refer the matter
to a summary court. It is the duty of the summary court
to secure the effects of the decedent in camp or quarters.
Where death occurs in the United States, the summary
court may not go beyond the limits of the post to secure
effects.46 It may not, for example, take possession of se-
curities in a safe deposit box or an automobile garaged in
a nearby village. In an overseas theatre, however, effects
found at any place within the theatre are comprehended. 7
Effects may include cash in any amount, and articles of
any size ordinarily possessed by a person in military
service.48
The summary court is authorized to collect debts due
the decedent by local debtors. This provision is construed
as distinguishing between debtors at the decedent's domi-
cile and those residing in the vicinity of his military
station.49 Prior to the enactment of this provision in 1916,
46 1 Bull. J.A.G. 27 (1942).
47 The same distinction is made as to local creditors and debts due
locally, the intent being to differentiate between place of duty and
domicile. It does not appear to be based upon the possible view that
federal jurisdiction is exclusive in the overseas theatre.
48 Cash in an amount exceeding $2,000 may be delivered to the widow
without requiring her to apply for letters. 5 Bull. J.A.G. 342 (1946).
There is some question whether "effects" can be limited by regulations.
Unless so limited, it includes all personal property capable of being
packed, crated and transported, in the possession of decedent. Opinion
of Oct. 17, 1919, Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 393 (1942).
49 Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40 § 470 (2). Money on deposit in a Paris
bank by a member of the American Expeditionary Forces is a "local
debt." See note 47, snipra.
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custom permitted the officer charged with the duty of
securing a decedent's effects to receive debts paid volun-
tarily. 0 The statute as now construed gives no greater
authority to the summary court officer. He is not a per-
sonal representative, and may therefore not sue to collect
debts., Recourse may be had to military orders to compel
payment if the debtor is subject to military control.52
During the late war, a different rule was applied in the
overseas theatres. The War Department insisted that
under principles of international law, the individual soldier
is entitled to the protection of the laws of the United
States when serving abroad, whether in friendly or oc-
cupied enemy territory.53 The British obligingly clothed
the summary court with authority -to collect debts, by suit
if necessary.54 It will therefore remain moot whether a
summary court in England collected by authority of Ameri-
can law or British. War Department regulations required
the summary court in overseas theatres to collect debts."
The question was raised, but not answered, whether this
regulation applied in Hawaii.-6
The summary court is authorized to pay debts due un-
disputed local creditors out of any money of the decedent
coming into his hands. The summary court is not author-
ized, however, to sell personal effects for the purpose of
paying debts.5 If there is an encumbrance on the article,
the summary court is therefore without authority to sell
50 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 762 (2d ed. 1920 reprint).
51 Opinion of Mar. 12, 1919, Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 386 (1942).
52 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 762 (2d ed., 1920 reprint).
53 Opinion J.A.G., file 1943/2360, February 3, 1943.
54 British Statutory Rules and Orders, No. 2562 (1942).
55 Par. 18, War Dept. Circular No. 85, March 16, 1945.
S6 The territorial law of Hawaii was amended in 1945 to provide that
where non-resident military or naval personnel die leaving property not
exceeding $1500 and there is no administration within the territory, the
clerk of the circuit court may be appointed administrator or ancillary
administrator. The question presented is whether Article 112 precludes
territorial legislation on the subject. Opinion J.A.G., file 1945/6879, July
11, 1945.
57 This prohibition is restated in par. 34, War Dept. Circular No. 85,
March 16, 1945. See also opinions of Oct. 6, 1931, and Aug. 24, 1927;
Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 391, 3 (1942).
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to discharge the lien. If the lien is large, the court may
abandon the property;" otherwise, the court must ship
it, having first notified the lienor.? While there is no
statutory authority therefor, Army regulations permit
sale to be made by the summary court if authorized by the
distributee, 0 and in such case to disburse the proceeds
of the sale as the distributee directs; for example, to dis-
charge liens. In this event, the summary court does not
act under the authority of Article 112, but as the agent
of the distributee. There appears to be an inconsistency
in the opinions of the Judge Advocate General on this
point. If Article 112 is not a statute of descent and dis-
tribution, and if the distributor takes no title by virtue
thereof as the Judge Advocate General has held, the sum-
mary court is being advised to sell as agent for one who
may have no title, and thus to risk personal liability. It
should also be noted that while sale of personal effects
may be made where the distributee cannot be found, the
proceeds may not be used to discharge debts other than
funeral expenses."
After the assets of the decedent have been collected, it
becomes the duty of the summary court to determine
whether any of the distributees designated in the Article
112 can be found. If this can be done, the assets are turned
over to the unit quartermaster for delivery to that one of
the persons designated in Article 112 who is considered
to have the primary right. In determining who has the
primary right, the War Department is guided to some
extent by considerations of state law, but is not bound
58 Where an automobile was sold to decedent a year before his death
for $467, of which amount decedent had paid only $37, held, that the
summary court may surrender to dealer. Opinion of Aug. 2, 1934, Dig.
Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 391 (1942).
59 The lienor would thus be able to apply for letters of administration
to protect his interest. Opinion of August 24, 1927, Dig. Ops. J.A.G.
1912-40, 393 (1942).
60 Par. 34, War Dept. Circular No. 85, March 16, 1945. The Effects
Quartermaster of an overseas theatre may not sell bulky or perishable
effects unless authorized by distributee. Opinion J.A.G., file 1944/8066,
August 28, 1944.
61 Funeral expenses are authorized to be paid under the act authoriz-
ing the settlement of War Department accounts, See note 6, supra.
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thereby. 2 This follows the settled rule of administrative
interpretation that Article 112 is not a statute of descent
and distribution, and that the right to receive the effects
is not to be considered as vesting title in the distributee. 3
Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that assets may
be delivered either to the widow or to a personal represent-
ative at the option of the court, but the personal repre-
sentative will be preferred. 4 Where there is no personal
representative, the summary court may deliver effects
and cash to a widow charged with the murder of her hus-
band; but notice should be given the decedent's next of
kin, and reasonable time in which to move for the appoint-
ment of an administrator pendente lite." The summary
court may not question the claim of an administrator ap-
pointed by a state court of probate although it appears
that decedent neither resided in the state nor had assets
there." In a recent case, where two administrators ap-
pointed in different states claimed the assets, the sum-
mary court was held free to choose between them.67
62 Where the summary court has notice of a will which directs a
disposition at variance with Article 112, it should notify the beneficiary
and allow a reasonable time in which to probate the will. Opinion of
March 21, 1932, Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 391 (1942).
63 "Article 112 is not a statute of distribution. It simply provides a
list of the persons to whom the effects of a deceased soldier may be
sent, and the War Department is relieved of responsibility therefor."
Opinion of August 12, 1918, Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 388 (1942).
64 "Be this as it may, certainly the use of the alternative expression
'the legal representative or widow' and again 'to the widow or legal
representative', makes it optional with the commanding officer or sum-
mary court where both . . . are present or both are absent." Opinion of
Sept. 22, 1923, Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 389 (1942).
65 Where a widow was held in custody of civil authorities, charged
with murder, it was held proper to hold distribution pending outcome of
the trial unless a personal representative should be appointed mean-
while; but quaere, whether if the widow were convicted, delivery could
be made to her. Opinion J.A.G., file 1943/3153, March 3, 1943.
66 "Letters of administration are prima facie evidence of all they pur-
port to show (18 Cyc. 140); and the jurisdiction of the court is not sub-
ject to collateral attack." Opinion of Sept. 22, 1923, Dig. Ops. J.A.G.
1912-40, 389 (1942).
67 While the usual rule is, that the court which has first taken juris-
diction will be preferred, one of the two administrators being also the
widow, it was thought better to select that one. 5 BulL. J.A.G. 342 (1946).
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Effects may not be delivered to the executor unless the
will has been probated and letters testamentary have been
issued,68 but the effects may be delivered to the bene-
ficiary under a will, fair on its face, which has not actually
been probated. In a recent case, a large sum of money
found among decedent's effects were directed to be de-
livered to the widow without requiring her to obtain letters
of administration." A cognate statute7' requires any will
found among the decedent's effects to be delivered prompt-
ly to a proper court of record; but it does not appear to
require the military authorities to offer it for probate.
Even where there is a beneficiary named in a will, the
property cannot be delivered to the beneficiary if there
is a widow or other relative having a primary right to
distribution.7 2 The beneficiary can protect himself by ap-
plying for probate of the will, and a reasonable time will
be allowed for that purpose.
The appearance of additional female components during
the late war made it necessary to determine the rights
of a surviving husband, for whom there is no provision
in Article 112. The Judge Advocate General interpreted
the word "widow" to include the widower. 3 Where several
persons of a class would be entitled, delivery is made to
one only, as to the older brother, and if no brothers, the
68 See note 44, supra.
9 Otherwise the provisions of Article 112 would be meaningless; for
if the will has been probated, then the personal representative would
be preferred to the beneficiary. Opinion J.A.G., file 19i1i, 102si, Sept. 19,
1944.
70 5 Bull. J.A.G. 342 (1946).
,A 46 Stat. 1203 (1931), U.S.C. § 1584 a (1940).
72 The summary court should notify the beneficiary in such a case, and
allow a reasonable time in which to probate the will. Opinion of March
21, 1932, Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 391 (1942). An earlier opinion of
June 9, 1924, indicates that the beneficiary named in a will will be
preferred to all other persons, including the widow and personal rep-
resentative. Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 388 (1942).
73 He also took the view that where an interlocatory decree of divorce
had been entered, but was not yet absolute, and according to state law
this did not dissolve the marital bonds, the widower was entitled to
distribution. 3 Bull. J.A.G. 192 (1944).
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older sister.74 Presumably the same rule would be applied
in a distribution to "next of kin". If the summary court
delivers to the wrong person, the United States is not
liable to the designated distributee and has no means to
force the summary court to make good the loss; but this
would not preclude an action in a proper court against
the officer who constituted the summary court. 5
If the proper distributees cannot be found within thirty
days, the summary court is directed to sell the effects
and deposit the proceeds with a disbursing officer of the
War Department. 7' Many classes of property are exempted
from sale, particularly manuscripts and articles valued
chiefly as keepsakes." These are turned over to the
Soldiers' Home and held intact for three years, during
which time they may be claimed by the person entitled to
distribution under Article 112.7- The proceeds of effects
which have been sold may be paid out under the act
regulating settlement of War D,.partment accounts
79 if
claimed within six years. 0
74 Opinion of August 12, 1918, Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 388 (1942).
Under the act regulating settlement of accounts (note 6, supra), brothers
ard sisters would share equally.
75 "The matter is one for adjustment between the parties claiming the
property." Opinion of June 9, 1924; Dig. Ops. 3.A.G. 1912-40, 389 (1942).
For a discussion of the personal liability of officers constituting a court-
martial who excede their authority, see note 34, supra.
76 Par. 31, Army Regulations 600-550, Dec. 1944; War Dept. Technical
Manual 12-240, p. 30, Jan. 1945.
77 See Article of War 112, note 5, szuprt. In addition to the articles
enumerated in the statute, Army regulations prohibit sale of stocks,
bonds, bank deposits, and commercial paper. Par. 30, Army Regulations
600-550, 24 December 1944.
78 Disposition of effects exempted from sale and the proceeds of sale,
is regulated by 46 Stat. 1203 (1931), 10 U.S.C. § 1584a (1940). If not
claimed within three years, all property except decorations, medals and
citations may be sold.
79 34 Stat. 750 (1906), 10 U.S.C. § 868 (1940), supra, note 6.
so This latter provision amounts in effect to a federal escheat law.
State courts recognize the power of the federal government to provide
for the escheat of pension funds, even after they have been paid to a
guardian accountable to a state court; but this is the extent of the




It has been noted above" that there is no authority to
pay debts other than funeral expenses out of the proceeds
of articles sold when the distributee cannot be found.
There is some question whether the summary court can
resort to this procedure where he cannot decide between
claimants. Where a soldier left three widows, all support-
ing their claims with competent evidence, the summary
court was advised to sell the articles ;12 but where the
summary court was forced to decide between an alleged
widow whose proof was unsatisfactory, and the father,
the summary court was advised to recognize the father if
convinced that the alleged widow did not meet the burden
of proof, but first to give both an opportunity to apply
to a state probate court for grant of letters.83 Where it
was ascertained that the relatives resided in Holland, then
under enemy occupation, the summary court was in-
structed to proceed as if the distributees could not be
ascertained. 1
In explaining that Article of War 112 is not a statute
of descent and distribution, it is frequently said that the
purpose of the statute is to protect the effects from loss,
and to provide a means by which the War Department
can be discharged of responsibility therefor." If it were
not for the protection of this article, effects would disap-
pear; in fact, effects do disappear, Article 112 to the con-
trary notwithstanding. 6 This is not an indictment of the
S1 See note 61, supra.
22 Opinion of March 29, 1928, Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40, 390 (1942).
33 Opinion J.A.G., file 210.871, April 22, 1942. In both case,,, there
were other persons who would be entitled to delivery of the effects if
there were no widow. The cases may possibly be distinguished on the
basis that in the first, it was certain that there was a widow, the prob-
lem being to determine which of several claimants was she; while in
the second case, the existence of a widow was in dispute.
341 Bull. J.A.G. 27 (1942). The writer of this opinion evidently did
not expect the war to last longer than six years, and therefore did not
contemplate loss of the beneficiary's right to claim as provided in 46
Stat. 1203 (I,31), 10 U.S.C. § 1584a (1940).
ks See note 63, supra.
86 One combat pilot, shot down over Jugoslavia and returned to mili-
tary control through the underground, told the writer that his effects
could not be found, but that he managed to locate several items through
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American soldier. Men who share each others lives closely
as they do in Army life tend to regard the property of one
as the property of all. It may be true that it is "under-
stood" in the company that survivors are to divide the
effects. This is recognized to some extent wherever there
is authority to probate the nuncupative wills of soldiers.
Many complaints were received from relatives that effects
were missing: a large sum of money known to have been
carried in a belt, a gift watch, the receipt of which had
just been acknowledged, a fine camera purchased from a
refugee for a few bars of chocolate. These claims were
promptly and thoroughly investigated, 7 but due to delay
before losses were discovered, rapid movement of troops
in the field and turnover of personnel through casualties
and replacement, little could be expected to result. As to
liability of the government, it was held that the War De-
partment could not make settlement of a claim for articles
stolen.88 If items shown in the inventory of effects pre-
pared by the summary court were not accounted for, a
claim would be allowed against the government.89
Occasionally the problem arose of identifying the owner
of effects. The wreckage of an airplane might be found
to contain a large amount of cash, but it might be im-
possible to determine which of several persons killed in
correspondence with members of his unit. Loss of effects, even from a
guarded warehouse, was regarded as an incident of service, and the
claim of the missing person could not be settled administratively. 3 Bull.
J.A.G. 477 (1944).
7 See the following unpublished opinions of the J.A.G.: 1944/3498,
April 12, 1944; 1944/4034, April 24, 1944.
ss A claim lies by the owner of property included by mistake among
the effects of decedent by a summary court. 3 Bjull. J.A.G. 66 (1944).
There is no basis for charging the government where the taking by
military personnel is criminal. Dig. Ops. J.A.G. 1912-40 § 463(3). For
claim by widow for effects of decedent negligently lost, see 4 Bull
J.A.G. 19 (1945).
.9 The summary court, having sold effects, sent a money order to the
mother, which was never received. The summary court officer was
subsequently killed. Held, that the officer being legally required to
secure the effects under Article 112, the government became a bailee.
Claim was settled administratively. 4 Bull. J.A.G. 62 (1945).
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the crash was the owner. In such cases, the summary court
was directed to proceed as if the distributees could not
be ascertained. In effect, this puts the burden of proof
upon the claimant.
In order to handle the removal of effects from distant
theatres at a time when transportation was difficult to
obtain and to relieve troops in the field of as much ad-
ministration detail as possible, a system of depots for
disposing of effects was established during the late war.9 '
These were placed in charge of effects quartermasters.
Depots were located in each theatre and a central depot,
at Kansas City, Missouri. In all cases where there was
no widow present in the theatre, the commanding officer
inventoried the effects and sent them to the theatre ef-
fects quartermaster. The latter was appointed a summary
court by competent authority. The theatre effects quarter-
master was given the option of shipping effects directly
to the distributee or to the Kansas City Quartermaster
Depot, where the effects quartermaster had also been
appointed a summary court? 2 In effect, the theatre sum-
mary court operated as an ancillary administrator to the
central depot court.
One phase of this operation involved the institution of
procedures whereby objectionable material could be with-
drawn from the effects before shipment home:"' blood-
stained clothing, contraband and gruesome souvenirs, and
the like. Government issue equipment was withdrawn, 4
90 2 Bull. J.A.G. 145 (1943), Opinion of Aug. 31, 1920, Dig. Ops. J.A.G.
1912-40, 392 (1942).
91 The Effects Quartermaster, Kansas City, was designated in war
Dept. Circular No. 195 of 1943. Theatre effects quartermasters were
appointed by orders of the theatre commander. The theatre effects
quartermaster was appointed a summary court in accord with opinion
J.A.G., file 1943/16315, Nov. 13, 1943.
92 Handling of effects overseas governed by a series of circulars, cul-
minating in War Dept. Circular No. 85, March 16, 1945.
93 Par 16b(4)b, War Dept. Circular 373, September 14, 1944. Circular
No. 85, March, 1945. Material not suitable for release for security
reasons was temporarily impounded by censorship authorities. Ibid.
94 Par. 16a(2), War Dept. Circular 373, September 14, 1944. Par. 27,
Army Regulations 600-550, Dec. 1944.
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as this constitutes no part of the decedent's effects. Other
items entitled to shipment at public expense caused prob-
lems. British automobiles depreciated greatly in value if
shipped to this country. Radios designed for British volt-
age were useless. The quartermaster was without author-
ity to sell these effects unless the distributee authorized
sale or could not be found. 5 The Judge Advocate General
approved the procedure of distributing candy and food
among service organizations and hospitals, a sensible if
extralegal solution.9'
Bulky effects also caused trouble. There is no limitation
in Article 112 as to size or amount. During the First World
War, the Judge Advocate General ruled that effects en-
titled to shipment at public expense did not include articles
not normally brought into camp or quarters: a motor boat
or a private airplane; but an automobile was considered
to be a proper article.97 The War Department considered
issuing an order prohibiting military personnel from ac-
quiring bulky property; but the Judge Advocate General
expressed the opinion that this would not warrant con-
fiscation of an article purchased in violation of the order,
nor could such property be denied shipment without
amendment of Article 112.91
As noted above, amounts under one thousand dollars
due the decedent by the government on account of pay
and allowances may be paid to the widow or next of kin
without administration." Accounts will be settled with
95 Opinion J.A.G., file 1944/8066, Aug. 28, 1944.
96 Ibid.
97 Opinions J.A.G. file 524, April 17, 1930, June 2, 1930, March 24, 1931.
98 "Although under certain conditions it is within the authority of the
War Department to limit administratively the amount and kind of per-
sonal property which may be in the possession of persons subject to
military law, there is no authority in the War Department to enforce
such limitations by confiscation, and the violation of such administra-
tively imposed limitations would not destroy the rights created by Article
of War 112 and section 12 of the Missing Persons Act to transportation
and incidental storage." Opinion J.A.G., file 1945/3927, April 21, 1945,
9934 Stat. 750 (1906) as amended, 58 Stat. 795 (1944), 10 U.S.C.
. 868 (1946). See note 6, supra. Claims are settled by the Claims Divi-
sion, General Accounting office. For procedure, see Army Regulations
35-1545, April 19, 1945.
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the personal representative, if there is one, upon presenta-
tion of a duly authenticated copy of letters testamentary
or of administration. 00 It would seem that a reasonable
time should be allowed in which to make certain that
letters will not be applied for; but this does not appear
to be the practice.' In addition to amounts due on ac-
count of pay and allowances, soldiers' deposits and claims
for loss of property which accrued prior to death may be
settled under this act.12 It has been noted above that the
proceeds of the sale of effects and cash, when turned over
to a disbursing officer because the distributees cannot be
found, may be disbursed under this act. 03 Cash found
among decedent's effects is usually paid out under Article
112.104 It should be noted that the death gratuity, equal
to six month's pay and allowances, paid to the widow or
dependent relative, 105 is an amount due the beneficiary
directly, and is not settled under this act.
At the beginning of the war, the amount which could
be disbursed under this statute was limited to five hundred
dollars. If the estate exceeded that amount, no part could
be paid without administration.'0 ' Increases in pay sched-
ules and amounts credited to the accounts of missing per-
sons swelled the accounts of decedents to the point where
100 Compare notes 44 and 66, supra. The War Department claims the
right to set off indebtedness due by decedent. Sturgeon v. U. S., 60 Ct.
Cl, 94 (1924).
101 In the report of the house committee, it is stated that the purpose
of the act and the amendments is to authorize immediate payment of
amounts up to one thousand dollars to the widow without waiting for
or requiring the grant of letters. H. Rep. 1919, 78 Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
102 Soldier's deposits constitute a debt due the decedent. Opinion
J.A.G., file 1945/1333, February 2, 1945. A claim which accrued prior
to death is likewise an amount due decedent. 1 Bull. J.A.G. 19 (1942).
Where decedent's effects have been negligently lost, the claim Is not one
due decedent, but to the personal representative or persons entitled under
state law to distribution. 4 Bull. J.A.G. 19 (1945).
103 46 Stat. 1203 (1931); 10 U.S.C. § 1584a (1940).
104 5 Bull. J.A.G. 342 (1946).
10s 41 stat. 367 (1919) as amended; 10 U.S.C. § 903 (Supp. 1946). See
note 26, supra.
106 3 Comp. Gen. 409 (1924).
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administration was required in a great majority of cases.107
In asking authority for the increase, it was represented
that it would make possible the settlement of most ac-
counts without administration. 0 1 Authorization to pay one
thousand dollars without administration where the estate
was larger, although contingent upon no claim being
presented by a duly appointed personal representative,
was said to be for the purpose of giving the widow one
thousand dollars immediately without waiting for adminis-
tration to be complete. As a practical matter, where the
total amount exceeds one thousand dollars by a trifling
amount, the widow now appears to have an election either
to take one thousand dollars under the act and waive the
balance, or to pay the expenses of administration and
take the entire amount.
A problem cognate to that of disposing of the effects
and settlement of the accounts of deceased persons is
raised when military personnel are reported missing. The
acts of Congress permit the effects to be sent to the home
of the missing person at public expense.' The same
system of depots used in the handling of decedents' effects
took care of the property of missing persons.' 0 The ef-
fects quartermaster could not pay debts or sell the effects
of a missing person prior to the time the latter was de-
clared dead. The device of securing a power of attorney
to dispose of effects was suggested; but it was pointed
out that the power might be void if the donor were actual-
ly dead."'
[07 The Pay Readjustment Act of 1942 156 Stat. ;59) virtually doubled
the pay of enlisted men. Under the Missing Persons Act of 1942 (56
Stat. 143) pay was credited during periods of absence. See note 118,
inf ra.
JOSH, Rep. 1919, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). It is the view of the
writer, however, that the language of the statute is inconsistent with
the construction placed upon it by the committee.
109 Sec. 12, Missing Persons Act, 56 Stat. 146 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 1012 (1946 Supp.).
I10 War Dept. Circular 85, March 16, 1945.
)11 Opinion J.A.G., file 1944/8066, August 28, 1944. See par. 16b (4)
of War Dept. Circular 195 (Sept. 1, 1943). The subject of powers of




Under the rule applicable in most states, it is impossible
to administer the estate of a missing person before seven
years have passed, unless it can be found with reasonable
certainty that he is dead."2 If a man known to have been
aboard a ship torpedoed in the North Atlantic in January,
1918, was not heard from for several months, it might
reasonably have been concluded that he perished in the
disaster; but there are numerous islands in the South
Pacific and rescue equipment has been greatly improved
in recent years." '3 During the First World War, casualty
reports were exchanged promptly by the belligerents; but
during the present war, the Japanese government, which
quickly overran our outposts in Asia and the Philippines,
refused to render casualty reports.'1 4 The fate of many
who were taken prisoners and many who died in the fight-
ing, was not known until the surrender of Japan.
In order to cope with this situation, an act of Congress
made it possible during the present war"' for the Secre-
tary of War to declare a person dead who had been re-
ported missing after an absence of one year."6 If the facts,
however, were consistent with survival, the the secretary
might continue that person in a missing status until a
later date." 7 So long as a person remained in a missing
112 See note 11, supra.
113 An enlisted man, member of the crew of a Navy plane shot down
over the Pacific, lived a Robinson Crusoe existence on a desert island
from August, 1942, to April, 1943. On being rescued, he filed a claim for
subsistence and quarters allowances. Denied. 23 Comp. Gen. 207 (1943).
114 H. Rep. 1680, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); S. Rep. 1060, 77th Cong.,
2d Seas. (1942); H. Rep. 1832, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
11S The act is effective from September 8, 1939, until twelve months
after the termination of the war with Germany, Italy or Japan, or such
earlier time as may be designated by concurrent resolution of the Con-
gress or by proclamation of the President. See. 15; 56 Stat. 147 (1942)
amended by 56 Stat. 1093 (1942); 50 U.S.C. App. § 1015 (Supp. 1946).
116 Sec. 5, Missing Persons Act; 56 Stat. 145 (1942) as amended; 56
Stat. 1093 (1942); 50 U.S.C. App § 1005 (Supp. 1946). For full text, see
note 10, supra.
117 Lapse of time without information is deemed to establish a reason-
able presumption that a missing person is no longer alive. Added to
sec. 9, Missing Persons Act, by 58 Stat. 680 (1944); 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 1009 (Supp. 1946). The presumptive date of death is fixed by the
finding. Sec. 5, supra. It will be superseded by an actual finding of
death, whenever the facts warrant. Ibid.
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status, pay and allowances were credited to his account" '
and family allowances and allotments were continued. The
Secretary of War was also given power to institute or
increase family allowances and allotments when he deemed
the family needs to require it."' No person was declared
dead without a careful investigation of all the circum-
stances by a board of general officers, assisted by a staff
judge advocate.'20 Nevertheless, a few persons who had
been declared dead, returned from Japanese prison camps
to claim wives who had remarried.
Acting upon the administrative determination of death,
the Army disposed of effects, settled accounts, and paid
gratuities. 21 The Veterans' Administration paid govern-
ment life insurance and other benefits.2 -2 Adhering to the
views expressed in interpreting Article 112, the depart-
ment construed the act as effective only for War Depart-
ment purposes, and refused to pass upon its effect under
state law. 23 A commercial life insurance company would
be furnished a certificate of death showing the circum-
118 Sec. 2, Missing Persons Act; 56 Stat. 144 (1942) as amended by 58
Stat. 679; 50 U.S.C. App. § 1002 (Supp. 1946).
'19 Secs. 3, 4, Missing Persons Act; 56 Stat. 144 (1942) as amended by
56 Stat. 1092, 58 Stat. 680 (1944); 50 U.S.C. App. H 1003, 4 (Supp.
1946).
12' The War Department Dependency Board, reporting to the Chief,
Casualty Branch, Adjutant General's Office. The identity of the officers
composing the board was classified. Pa. 46, Army Regulations 35-5520,
Sept. 30, 1944.
121 Opinion J.A.G., file 19413/13125, September 13, 1943; 2 Bull. J.A.G.
2.47 (1943).
122 58 Stat. 728 {1914); 38 U.S.C. § 733 tSupp. 1946).
123 A member of the house of representatives asked the opinion of
General Cramer, the Judge Advocate General, whether it would be
desirable to enact legislation making a certificate of the administrative
determination of death recordable in county offices of the several states
and admissible in court as evidence of death. General Cramer expressed
grave doubts as to the power of the federal government to require courts
or other instrumentalities of the several states to accept such a certificate
as bending with respect to the fact and time of death. File 1944/3866,
April 25, 1944. A refusal to recognize the War Department's finding of
death is found in state statutes, such as that in Pennsylvania authorizing
a trusteeship durante absentia. Act June 3, 1943, P.L. 839; 20 P.S. b 1090
and that in Florida dealing with powers of attorney, discussed in a
comment in this issue of the Quarterly.
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stances under which it was issued, but would not be ad-
vised that it was bound by federal law to accept the cer-
tificate as proof of death. 2 Likewise probate proceedings
could be instituted only when state law provided. 125 To the
inquiries of a wife whose husband had been missing eleven
months, General Cramer replied that the impending settle-
ment of her husband's accounts by the army would not
necessarily constitute a release from the bonds of matri-
mony, and that the state alone could determine whether
her remarriage would constitute bigamy.'
2
6
In conclusion, we note that the war now ending has
seen the introduction of new federal administrative pro-
cedures and the enlargement of old to a point where they
appear to transgress what was formerly considered the
boundary between state and federal jurisdiction. To the
extent that they have become reasonably necessary for
the proper conduct of the war, these measures may be
justifiable as necessary and proper extensions of the war
power. To the extent that they merely offer shortcuts to
state procedures deemed cumbersome and costly, they
appear to formulate policy with respect to the administra-
tion of estates which the state alone has power to form-
ulate.
It may be true that a party who would otherwise be
injured by this process has recourse to a probate court.
It must be remembered, however, that state probate pro-
cedures rest upon notice to all parties. This element of
notice is wholly absent from the federal procedure, and a
meritorious claimant may be entirely unaware of the need
of applying for probate until after the assets have been
dissipated. Furthermore, in the case of presumed de-
cedents, the state courts are not always open to the
claimant. The state may protect its jurisdiction by pro-
viding a public administrator at public expense and it
124 Par, 37, Army Regulations 600-550, Dec. 23, 1944. Opinion J.A.G.,
file 1944/3866, April 25, 1944,
125 See note 123, supra.
126 Opinions J.A.G., file 1943/16045, Oct. 25, 1943; 1944/2842, March 20,
1944.
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may accept the federal determination of death; but in
so doing, it is being required to accept a policy formulated
for it by the federal government. Where boundaries so
long accepted have been crossed under the stress of emerg-
ency, one may wish for a more careful re-examination of
the question now that the emergency has passed.
